Is there something special about conscious intentionality? Event as iCalendar

(Philosophy, School of Humanities)

14 March 2018

11am - 1pm

Venue: Room 201, Humanities Building (206-201)

Associate Professor Elisabetta Sacchi | San Raffaele University, Italy

According to a position that is gaining more and more credence among scholars, intentionality is dependent (in some sense to be specified) upon phenomenality. This is labelled the “Phenomenal Intentionality Theory” (PIT).

In my paper I shall take PIT as my critical target. I shall make two claims: one negative and one positive. The negative claim is that phenomenality does not bring about either intentional directedness or intentional content. The positive claim is that phenomenality, while not bringing about an irreducible phenomenal/experiential kind of intentionality, does actually ground a crucial aspect of the intentionality of occurrent conscious states, namely their aspectuality.

According to the picture I shall put forward, aspectuality is not a unitary phenomenon, but one that comes in many different varieties one of which is conscious aspectuality, the kind of aspectuality that has its source in the phenomenal character of a conscious mental state. I shall conclude by discussing the relationship between conscious and unconscious aspectuality.

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